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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-1471 
___________ 
 
AURELIO VALVERDE,  
AKA Aurelio Santiago Valverde, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
   Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A042-978-294) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Ramin Rastegar 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 14, 2018 
 
Before:  RESTREPO, BIBAS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 20, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Petitioner Aurelio Valverde petitions for review of a final order of removal.  The 
Government has filed a motion for summary disposition.  We will grant the 
Government’s motion and deny the petition for review. 
 Valverde is a citizen of Peru.  He was admitted to the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident in 1991.  Between 2006 and 2013, Valverde was convicted of 
receiving stolen property, driving with a suspended license, driving while intoxicated, 
burglary, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping, all in violation of New Jersey law.  In 
2014, the Department of Homeland Security charged Valverde with being removable as 
an alien who had been convicted of a crime of violence.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  An Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered Valverde’s removal, and 
Valverde appealed.  The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded and ordered the 
IJ to reconsider the matter in light of this Court’s ruling in Baptiste v. Attorney General, 
841 F.3d 601, 604 (3d Cir. 2016), that part of the federal statute defining “crime of 
violence” is unconstitutionally vague.   
 On remand, the Government lodged a new charge of removability, alleging that 
Valverde was removable because he had been convicted of two crimes involving moral 
turpitude (conspiracy to commit kidnapping and receiving stolen property).  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  Counsel for Valverde argued that the Government was not permitted 
to assert a new charge of removal on remand; the IJ rejected that argument.  Counsel then 
conceded that Valverde had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude, see 
A.R. at 117-19, but applied for cancellation of removal.  The IJ denied the cancellation 
application, concluding that while Valverde was statutorily eligible, he did not warrant 
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relief as a matter of discretion.  Valverde appealed to the BIA, raising two arguments—
that the Government should not have been allowed to lodge the new removal charge and 
that the IJ should have granted cancellation of removal.  The BIA affirmed.   
 Valverde filed a petition for review to this Court.  He also filed a motion for a stay 
of removal, which we denied.  After Valverde filed his initial brief, the Government filed 
a motion to dismiss the petition or for summary disposition.  Valverde then filed a second 
motion to stay.   
 We generally have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1).  However, because Valverde conceded removability for having committed 
two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, § 1252(a)(2)(C)’s jurisdiction-stripping 
provision applies.  See generally Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 246-47 (3d Cir. 
2006).  As a result, our jurisdiction is limited to questions of law and constitutional 
claims.  See § 1252(a)(2)(D).1 
 In his brief, Valverde raises just a single claim: that principles of res judicata or 
collateral estoppel barred the Government from filing a new charge of removal after the 
case had been remanded by the BIA.  He is incorrect.  The Government may file new 
charges of removal “[a]t any time,” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(e); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.30—
including after remand, see Yong Wong Park v. Att’y Gen., 472 F.3d 66, 73 (3d Cir. 
2006) (rejecting judicial-estoppel challenge to post-remand amendment); Valencia-
                                              
1 In his brief, Valverde does not challenge the agency’s denial of his request for 
cancellation of removal.  In any event, we note that we also lack jurisdiction to review the 
discretionary denial of cancellation of removal.  See § 1252(a)(2)(B); Pareja v. Att’y 
Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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Alvarez v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1319, 1323-24 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting res-judicata 
challenge). 
 Having considered the Government’s motion for summary disposition and to 
dismiss, we grant the Government’s motion and will summarily deny the petition for 
review.  We also deny Valverde’s motion for a stay of removal.   
